about observation as a component of personal intelligences

May 22nd, 2010

Observational skills? What do you think about someone who is a very observant person? Someone who notices details that others miss. Or perhaps someone that pays attention to trends that others ignore. You probably think of this as a skill rather than an intelligence, for that is what we have been conditioned to believe. We probably think of this as a valuable skill to have for say a detective, but perhaps we wouldn’t consider it all that important in our daily lives for the average person.

However, I think of observation abilities as a form of intelligence, falling under the heading of what Gardner called the “personal intelligences.” However, I don’t feel that Gardner gave observational intelligence its just due. While it is true that it is an important type of intelligence for someone such as a detective or counselor, observational intelligence can serve everyone in their daily lives. Observational intelligence can lead to good problem solving – for example, noticing things that others don’t notice. That of course can be helpful in nearly any position.
And we shouldn’t fail to realize just how key observational intelligence plays a role in the greater domain of personal intelligence. The ability to “read people” and to understand their motivations can be an extremely valuable type of intelligence in a workplace setting and personal relationships. While it is true that it is an invaluable “skill” for a psychologist or counselor to have, rarely has it been talked about as a sought after type of intelligence for anyone to have in order to succeed in their career and in their personal relationships.

Is being succinct a type of intelligence, and if so, what domain does it fall under?

May 12th, 2010

A quick Google search of the term succinct revealed a definition, but no mention of why being succinct is important or good, or if it indeed is. And a search of the American Psychological Association (APA) database also returned nothing on succinctness. However, when I did the Google search I noticed several articles that came up under the term “artificial intelligence” that mentioned the necessity of a succinct programming language.

To answer my own question of whether or not being succinct is a type of intelligence, I would say that yes it certainly is. As to what domain it falls under, I tend to think of it as a blend of logical & linguistic types of intelligences. Now, another interesting question is does our current intelligence testing measure succinctness? I don’t know the answer to that, but I’m planning to follow-up on it with my own research and I’ll post back to this blog after I learn more about it. I’m surprised however that I didn’t find more information on this on the APA website. In fact, I found none! But I have a collection of APA journals at my home that I’m also planning on reviewing and look for information on this topic. It could be that the idea of whether or not “succinctness” is a type of an intelligence, and one that is accounted for already by current IQ testing has already been asked and answered, and if that is the case, I’ll be happy to update my blog entry with the information that I find out. However, if it has been asked and answered, it certainly is not well-documented.

chronic diseases v. infectious diseases & psychology

April 21st, 2010

An interested coworker was asking me yesterday why psychology is considered “useful” in chronic disease prevention but not in infectious diseases. I thought this might make a good, quick blog topic.  The quick answer is that chronic diseases (like cancer, for example) are highly influenced by lifestyle and behavioral choices, where as infectious diseases typically aren’t. For example, people continue to smoke, overeat, refuse to exercise, etc. (lifestyle choices) even though they know these are significant risk factors for cancer. So why do people do it? That’s where the psychology part comes in. The answer of course is not so simple to understand what motivates people to self-destructive behavior, but that is where psychology and public health begin to overlap.

On the other hand, infectious diseases like influenza for example (the common flu) really don’t have so much to do with your lifestyle choices, at least not significantly. You can do “all the right things” and still get the flu. Infectious diseases are more determined by biology than psychology, you can’t always control whether or not you will be exposed to a virus (an infectious disease) but you can control lifestyle choices that lead to chronic diseases.

International travel: a new kind of “intelligence”

January 31st, 2010

Six years ago this summer I made my first “real” international travel (I’m not counting runs across the border to Mexico or travels that I am too young to remember). I travelled to Japan in summer 2004 and subsequently moved there to live in 2005 & 2006. Since that first international travel experience in summer 2004 I was hooked! There is a kind of buzz and excitement that comes from international travel. I’ve also travelled to Thailand annually and in some cases more than once a year since 2007. There is also a kind of “intelligence” I think that comes from learning about other cultures and geographical locations that probably doesn’t show-up on any IQ tests. I’m not talking about knowing the name of the capital city of Thailand or being able to point to it on a map (something I’m sure most Americans can’t do!) but rather more of a sociological knowledge.  Not to mention that I think when your horizons expand beyond your own borders you begin to view the world and your own country’s place in it differently. And of course living in a foreign country also provides opportunities to expand your sociological and cultural horizons, or IQ, as I like to think of it as.

Udon Thani: including Wat Pho & Wat Ard Su Ra Vi Han

January 3rd, 2010

**NOTE (you can click on the above photos to blow them up to full size)**

Udon Thani is approximately 560 km northeast of Bangkok and is considered Isaan’s “gateway city” to Laos. It is located about an hours drive from the Laotian border and has a population of approximately 225,000. During the Vietnam War, the city catered to the nearby Royal Thai Air Force Base and the American military. Yearly training events among the American military and the Thai military are still held here, so the city has developed a sort of “GI feel” with a lot of bars and massage parlors. However, the city has other historical and cultural attractions that are often overlooked. About 47km east of Udon Thani is Ban Chiang, a Bronze Age archaeological site. And amongst the city’s impressive wats are Wat Pho (a replicated design of the more famous “Wat Pho” in Bangkok) and Wat Ard Su Ra Vi Han – an often overlooked wat by tourists.

Wat Pho is quite impressive in terms of the size of the grounds and the numerous buildings. Many young Thai men perform their required monk “internships” at this wat. From the Charoensri Grand Royal Hotel (renamed the Centara Hotel & Convention Centre in 2009), and the adjacent main shopping plaza, it is about a 50 baht tuk tuk ride. Even more impressive is Wat Ard Su Ra Vi Han, which is located near one of the city’s 2 lakes – on the other side of the lake is a Chinese temple known as Sala Poo Ya which is worth a visit since you are in the area. You can walk around the concrete park path with some nice views of the lake, check out the Chinese temple (there’s a Chinese restaurant there as well), and then make your way over to the Thai temple. A tuk tuk ride from the Centara Hotel round trip, including wait time for the tuk tuk driver while you walk around the park and visit the Thai temple (allow about 1-2 hours), should run you about 300 baht.

Udon Thani also has a sizable night market, which is located about a 10-minute walk from the main shopping plaza (adjacent to the Centara Hotel). And there are many eateries located within walking distance or a short tuk tuk ride from here as well. The large shopping plaza is about 5 floors high and has a food court, movie theater, and KFC amongst other options. The city also has two city parks, one which is located across from Wat Ard Su Ra Vi Han and the other named Nong Prachak is located near Wat Pho and is quite impressive in size and is a favorite spot for locals to spend a lazy afternoon on the well-maintained grass.


Commuting to Udon Thani from Bangkok:

From Bangkok you have three flight options to Udon Thani. Yes, there are other travel options by bus or train, but these will all take 8 hours or more. You will save a few thousand baht perhaps, but loose a few hours in the process. I did take a VIP bus from Bangkok to Khon Kaen on two occassions and though it was comfortable enough, I really prefer to explore the highways and countryside on my own via car – maybe you feel differently.

THAI Airways flies three times daily from Suvarnabhumi (BKK) to Udon Thani – a mid-morning flight, afternoon flight and evening flight. Check their website for exact travel times. The fees will vary from about 3,500 baht to 5,000 baht (round trip) depending upon whether you are travelling during a peak season or holiday like Songkran (mid April).

Air Asia flies twice daily from Suvarnabhumi (BKK) to Udon Thani – an early morning flight and a late night flight. Again check the website for exact travel times. Sometimes you will find an Air Asia flight to be a little cheaper than THAI Airways, but in my experience they are often about the same and if I have an option, I like the afternoon flight better – Air Asia doesn’t offer one.

Nok Air flies twice daily from Don Mueang to Udon Thani – an early morning flight and an afternoon flight, no evening flights. Nok Air is perhaps good if you are flying domestically, but if you arrive on an international flight, you will arrive to what is often referred to as “the new airport” which is Suvarnabhumi (BKK). This means that you will need to take a metered taxi (about 650 baht and 45 minutes) to reach the old airport, Don Mueang. Although Nok Air is sometimes as much as 50% cheaper than either THAI Airways or Air Asia, when you factor in the taxi ride, the time lost, and the inconvenience I don’t feel it is a viable option if you are arriving on an international flight.



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The Mishandling of the Hurricane Katrina Disaster

December 6th, 2009

Abstract

In August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast killing nearly 2,000 people and causing approximately 100 billion dollars in damage. The disaster was ranked as one of the deadliest in United States history, with New Orleans suffering a great bulk of the damage. Eventually about 80% of the city became flooded which caused a series of public health issues. The damage of this natural disaster was shocking but even more shocking was how the response from local, state and federal public health and emergency response agencies was mishandled. Not only was the public health response criticized but it seems that New Orleans was not adequately prepared to handle such an event. Three areas will be discussed in this paper: the roles and responsibilities of the local, state and federal public health authorities and how these roles were unmet; how these agencies should have worked together before and after the disaster; and how these agencies could have better handled the problems that arose during and after the event. This paper will target specifically how to improve leadership among public health authorities during a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, recommendations for timely decision making during such a disaster, and how to make improvements to infrastructure and preparedness before a disaster.

The mishandling of the Hurricane Katrina disaster

Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August of 2005 and with it brought devastating damage to the region. The city of New Orleans was hit particularly hard and was the result of much of the monetary damage as well as human loss of life. Katrina exposed serious flaws in the United States’ disaster response capabilities (Howitt et al., 2006).

In the American disaster response schema, the initial responsibility for disaster response rests with local authorities (Howitt et al., 2006). This “bottom-up” approach makes sense in most emergencies because local governments are closer to disaster sites and therefore can provide quicker response as well as intimate knowledge of the area (Howitt et al., 2006). Aid from state or federal sources is generally provided in such instances where localized resources have been exhausted (Howitt et al., 2006). There are generally more specialized resources at the state and federal levels, but these resources are further away and their response time is longer, which is decidedly important in disaster response (Howitt et al., 2006).

Some of the other criticisms of the mishandling of Hurricane Katrina were cited as unqualified crisis managers and weak elected officials, inadequate preparedness plans, failure to make investments into infrastructure (particularly in the case of New Orleans) and poor and/or late decision making (Howitt et al., 2006).

“Crisis” emergencies like Hurricane Katrina are distinguished from routine emergencies by their novelty (Howitt et al., 2006). In other words, the “crisis” emergency presents something that the planners have not adequately planned for. According to Howitt et al., (2006), it is inevitable that at some point a community will be presented with this type of crisis disaster. These crisis disasters require different capabilities, for example: responders must identify the novel elements of the disaster. In the Hurricane Katrina disaster these novelties were: the need for assistance in the evacuation of people from their homes and from the city of New Orleans, the failing of the levees which resulted in significant flooding to the city, the unexpected use of the city’s convention center for sheltering refugees (which included providing food and law and order), and restoring water and power (Howitt et al., 2006).

Even though Hurricane Katrina was a local disaster, federal disaster relief was needed because of the magnitude of the disaster. No local municipality or state can afford to keep all the assets that are necessary in an emergency like Katrina in reserves, so turning to federal assistance was necessary (Howitt et al., 2006). As Howitt et al., (2006, p. 219) points out, the coordination of federal, state, and local agencies “demands skillful coordination of aid workers, equipment, and organizations across professions, agencies, jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public and private sectors.” No easy task. And many or most of the public health officials and organizations that were part of the post-Katrina response had little or no prior experience working together (Howitt et al., 2006).

This fact was at the center of the debacle of the post-recovery response from Hurricane Katrina; and illustrates the point quite clearly the need for such training to occur in disaster preparedness whereby individuals at the local, state, and federal levels that may be called to work together in the event of a large scale disaster need to have real-life training as such.

In fact, one could argue the point that the disaster response for Hurricane Katrina put NIMS – the National Incident Management System – that was created in 2002, to the test. Unfortunately, it was a failed effort which further points to the need for additional training on the management of this type of disaster. The purpose of NIMS, ideally, is to establish a clear division of labor and assignment of functional responsibility; and to clearly define the chain-of-command (Howitt et al., 2006). But in the disaster response post-Hurricane Katrina, the NIMS system was not effective in any of these areas. It is this writer’s opinion that the problem is one of management-style. The NIMS style opts for a “military-type” command system; even the terminology of “command system” and “chain-of-command” give the whole federal disaster response system a military feel. The military is quite capable in war-time efforts, but is not the most effective of systems in peace-keeping efforts. With NIMS on showcase in post-Katrina response we got a military-style effort; what we needed was a peace-keeping or humanitarian effort.

In the case of Katrina, there was noticeable friction between local and state officials, with the city officials and mayor on one side, and the state and governor on the other side. And both local and state officials criticized the federal response, most notably FEMA (Howitt et al., 2006).

Rosenbaum (2006, p. 437) writes: “(Katrina) exposed every public policy failure essential to community and population health. After the levees broke, we watched every single system associated with the life of a city fail: the electric grid, the water system, the sewer system, the transportation system, the telephone system, the police force, the fire department, the hospitals, even the system for disposing of corpses.” In fact, the devastation to New Orleans (and other areas) infrastructure was so great that more than one million people were homeless even as of December 2005, four months after the disaster struck (Rosenbaum, 2006).

When Hurricane Katrina struck, first responders were as unprepared for the disaster as they had been on 9/11 (Shughart, 2006). But why, and who was to blame? Why was FEMA delayed in their arrival? Why were no police or National Guard units in place to prevent looting (Shughart, 2006)? According to Shughart (2006, p. 32), “the fiasco was predictable because politicians and bureaucrats have relatively weak incentives to prepare for emergencies and to promptly mobilize the resources necessary to alleviate hardship when catastrophe strikes.”

While I agree with Shughart in that Government is certainly full of shortcomings, I’m not sure we can simply say “oh well, that’s Government for you” and forget about it. When a disaster the size of Katrina occurs and the response is as impotent as it was, I think we must address why it occurred and look for some solutions. It may not make the next big disaster go perfectly, but hopefully we can make some improvements when the inevitable occurs again.

And it isn’t as if public officials didn’t have ample warning about Katrina. On August 27, 2005 – two days before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast – Louisiana State University’s Center for the Study of the Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes predicted that New Orleans would flood as the result of Hurricane Katrina (Shughart, 2006). With this warning in hand, city officials should have evacuated the city, but they did not. In fact, another study two years prior to Hurricane Katrina found that a category 3 hurricane, which Katrina was, would flood the city (Shughart, 2006). So there was enough evidence to suggest that city officials should have put the city on alert and began evacuation procedures, but they did not.

The Army Corps of Engineers, who were responsible for both building and monitoring the levees around New Orleans, warned state and local officials that soil erosion had caused some stretches of the flood barrier to sink as much as three feet, and these areas must be repaired (Shughart, 2006). However, the levees were not repaired. Why did city or state officials not address the levees, knowing it was simply a matter of time before a category 3 storm would hit the city? When the storm reached New Orleans, the levees failed as predicted, and about 80% of the city was under water, 20 feet deep in some places (Shughart, 2006).

The best answer for why the levees were not repaired was because citizens of New Orleans did not voice their concerns loudly enough to politicians. That is not to say that it is the residents of New Orleans fault, but rather politicians will typically only address those issues that are likely to get them reelected (Shughart, 2006). Since citizens were not talking about levee repairs for the most part, city officials and politicians ignored it, choosing to spend money in other areas (Shughart, 2006). For politicians, money spent on infrastructure and repair is wasted money, because no one really sees it, it deteriorates over time, and the public isn’t generally aware of it (Shughart, 2006). So politicians generally ignore these types of infrastructure necessities, hoping that when a problem occurs, it will “happen on someone else’s watch” (Shughart, 2006).

Another issue regarding the levees was that they were overseen by four different governing boards, made up of gubernatorial and local political appointees, each with their own autonomy to some extent (Shughart, 2006). And in the city of New Orleans, there are independent water and sewer boards that run and maintain the pumps and canals needed for draining low-lying areas (Shughart, 2006). This fragmentation clearly had foreseeable consequences, for it seems that though the Army Corps of Engineers recommended repairs to the levees, it was unclear exactly who was responsible for the repairs (Shughart, 2006). The city thought the repairs should come from the governing boards responsible for the levees, and those boards thought the cost should be footed by the city of New Orleans. And it seems that past repairs to the levee system had been done rather haphazardly – repaired well in some areas using appropriate materials, repaired poorly in other areas using cheap or ineffective materials or erecting levees that were not sufficiently high enough (Shughart, 2006).

The Orleans Levee District (one such governing board) focused more on developing its prominence in the region and acquiring more political power in order to build parks, marinas, walking paths, and a commuter airport near Lake Pontchartrain in an order to make considerable profits (Shughart, 2006). And during this development of the area, very little money was put into levee repair by this governing board, instead opting for money-making developments. Lake Pontchartrain area was one of the hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina. Most of these developments by the Orleans Levee District board were destroyed (Shughart, 2006).

To address the fragmentation of government that we saw in the Hurricane Katrina example, it is essential that in situations such as these that one governing board be over the entire flood levee system. Or at least have a governing board that has the power and authority to enforce the “local” boards with regards to repairs. And this governing board should not be compromised by having real estate development interests and money-making schemes as its first priority.

But the failures of the Katrina response were not merely inadequate preparations. Both the mayor of New Orleans and the governor of Louisiana were heavily criticized regarding their actions or rather inactions for the first few days when Hurricane Katrina hit (Shughart, 2006). Mayor Nagin chose to “wait-out” the disaster in a local high-end hotel rather than being at Louisiana’s emergency operations facility in Baton Rouge (Shughart, 2006). Shughart (2006) also criticizes Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco for allowing the mayor to determine whether or not New Orleans should be under mandatory evacuation. It would seem that perhaps Governor Blanco was not confident enough to make such a decision, perhaps fearing the move would hurt the local and/or state’s economy. But she had ample evidence that Katrina was a severe enough hurricane that significant damage was likely to be done to the area, especially in light of New Orleans’ inadequate levee protection. Though the mayor should have called for the evacuation of the city, so should have the governor stepped in and done so when the mayor failed to do so. Both are to blame for the inadequate response in my opinion.

Once Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, communications between the mayor and the governor and between the governor and other public health officials were cut-off (Shughart, 2006). The governor was able to notify the president of the need for additional assistance the day that Katrina struck the city, but did not give a detailed list of what was needed until three days later (Shughart, 2006). Apparently this was due to her lack of communications with the mayor and other public health officials in the city. And then it was several days later before President Bush actually sent any aid (Shughart, 2006). So from the time the storm hit New Orleans to the time that aid actually arrived, about 5 days had passed (Shughart, 2006).

One way that this could have been avoided was to have all of the necessary players, the mayor, the governor, and other city and state officials at the command center, rather than having them separated in different parts of the city and state. In fact, this one of the main tenets of the NIMS system: the Incident Command Post (ICD). So why the ICD was not used in this case by officials is still unclear.

President Bush was also criticized for his lackluster response (Shughart, 2006). The President kept speaking engagements and continued his vacation even after learning of what was happening in New Orleans (Shughart, 2006). Looting and rioting were problems in the flooded streets of New Orleans, particularly since a significant portion of the police force had deserted the city (Shughart, 2006). It wasn’t until several days later that President Bush suggested to the governor that she allow federal National Guard units to impose martial law on the city. However, the governor refused (Shughart, 2006). Many accused the president of racism since the majority of those left behind and homeless in New Orleans were poor and black. But Shughart (2006) contends that the lackluster response from President Bush more likely had to do with motivation. President Bush was already in his second term with no re-election to worry about, and in an area of the country that is loyal to the Republican Party (Shughart, 2006).

I agree with Shughart’s contention about President Bush to some extent. But to say that a sitting president could care less about what happens during his second term because there is no re-election value I think it a bit off. Someone doesn’t reach the level of president without being an ego-maniac to some extent, and presidents always care about their legacy. This writer’s opinion is that President Bush waited to respond because both the mayor and the governor were democrats. President Bush wanted to see them fail and struggle to some extent so he could rush in and “save the city” from the inept democratic leadership. Unfortunately for President Bush, his own response along with his FEMA appointee, Michael Brown, were equally inept.

Perhaps no one, not even the mayor or governor or president took more blame than did FEMA (Shughart, 2006). According to Shughart (2006) the cause of FEMA’s inept response to Hurricane Katrina was the result of their reorganization after 9-11 into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security, where their role in disaster preparedness was diminished and they were forced to utilize their resources to “prevent another 9-11-style attack.” This left them ill-prepared to handle a natural disaster the size of Hurricane Katrina.

But it wasn’t only that FEMA was not accustomed to the role that it was cast into during the Katrina recovery, other criticisms were leveled at the then FEMA director, Michael Brown, who by his own acknowledgement was probably not the man for the job, despite President Bush’s infamous supportive statement of “Brownie you are doing a heck of a job!” (Hsu and Glasser, 2005). President Bush’s transparent self-interest statement of Brown aside, it was quite clear that as FEMA director, Brown, a lawyer with no real background in disaster management or public health, was in over his head; some even calling him “clueless” (Hsu and Glasser, 2005 & CNN, 2006). Brown resigned his post shortly after Katrina (Hsu and Glasser, 2005).

Despite the poor leadership of FEMA, a more central issue is at hand in my opinion. We can replace all the FEMA directors we want, but the real issue is the role that FEMA has been cast into as part of the Department of Homeland Security. Acts of terrorism in this country, both foreign and domestic, have been quite rare. The amount of money that is being allocated to combat terrorism are funds that are misappropriated in my opinion. Perhaps even some republicans agreed for one of their recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security was to increase FEMA’s budget by 10% in 2007 (CNN, 2006). Additionally, an organization like FEMA must be allowed to do what it does best, disaster preparedness, not trying to thwart terror attacks – that is what the CIA and or/FBI should be doing.

What is perhaps most interesting about the ineptness of the local, state, and federal government responses was how well by comparison private companies like Wal Mart were able to offer assistance to victims of Katrina (Shughart, 2006). According to Shughart (2006, p. 42), “Wal Mart frequently beat FEMA by days in getting trucks filled with emergency supplies to relief workers and citizens.” Both Home Depot and Fed Ex also leant support in similar efficient style in the aftermath of the disaster (Shughart, 2006).

So what does this say about our Governmental preparedness to handle disasters when private companies are able to outperform them? Is it simply inevitable that the more talented of individuals will find themselves employed in the private sector because their talents are better appreciated and more rewarded there? Government would need to increase salary amounts or provide other types of incentives such as easy-qualifying home loans or student loan repayment in order to attract more talented individuals into the Government positions. Or is it less of a reflection of government personnel and more a reflection of poor infrastructure? Private sector tends to shoot for top performance due to profitability, whereas government wants standardization, control, and an acceptable level of performance.

Recommendations

In summary, there were several factors that led to the mishandling of the Katrina response, both in terms of pre-event planning and post-recovery response. First, it is conceivable that if the necessary infrastructure repairs had been put into place, most notably in the levee repairs and they had been performed to an adequate level, that the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and the havoc it brought about on New Orleans would have been much less severe. In my opinion, despite the poor leadership of the mayor, the governor, the president, and FEMA, those repairs alone may have saved countless lives and dollars. But the disaster did shed light on other issues of leadership and governmental structure that are lessons that we can learn from and hopefully use to prepare for the next inevitable disaster.

Second, fragmentation of government will always likely be an issue, but we must work to ensure that in situations such as infrastructure repair to something so important as levees, that only one governing body has the ultimate authority and responsibility for maintenance.

Third, I believe we need to restructure our disaster response into something less “military-style” as NIMS is, and opt for something that is more focused on a humanitarian effort. Perhaps lessons can be learned from how Wal Mart and other private sector businesses outperformed the military-styled NIMS system. And fourth, FEMA must be removed from the Department of Homeland Security and given back its primary role of disaster preparedness.

References:

CNN. (2006, February 14). Report: Katrina response a ‘failure of leadership.’ Retrieved from

http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/13/katrina.congress/index.html

Howitt, A & Leonard, H. (2005). Katrina and the Core Challenges of Disaster Response.
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30(1), 215-221.

Hsu, S. & Glasser, S. (2005, September 6). FEMA Director Singled Out by Response
Critics. Washington Post. Retrieved from

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501590.html

Rosenbaum, S. (2006). US Health Policy in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. American
Medical Association, 295(4), 437-440.

Shughart II, W. (2006). Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of Disaster Relief.
Public Choice, 127(1), 31-53.

Bioterrorism Scenario Using Aerosolized Anthrax

December 5th, 2009

**The following is a fictitious scenario that I created for one of my public health courses:

Outbreak Scenario

On October 12th, 2009 at 9:32am, a group calling themselves “The Movement” contacted members of the local media in Phoenix to tell them that a bioterrorism “bomb” had been released at the Arizona Cardinals stadium in Glendale during a football game on October 11th, which had several thousand fans in attendance. The group claimed that it had released anthrax (a category A agent) in an aerosolized manner. The group expressed that they are an anti-immigration group that is angered by Phoenix’s lax immigration standards. The media then immediately contacted the Phoenix Police Department and notified both the Maricopa County Health Department and the Arizona (state) Department of Health.

On October 12th at 10:04am, officials at the state and county health departments held a teleconference call where it was determined that the local hospitals should be contacted to notify physicians and epidemiologists to be on the look-out for cases of inhalation anthrax. Physicians were asked to confirm their diagnosis of anthrax via a blood culture test and to submit the blood culture to the state lab for confirmation. Physicians would then be notified by the state lab if there was a confirmation of the diagnosis. However, since inhalation anthrax is a fast progressing disease, physicians were instructed to begin administering antibiotics for any suspected cases of anthrax even before blood test confirmation. The public health officials also contacted the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and asked that shipments of ciprofloxacin and Biothrax be readied in the event that there was a shortage of needed antibiotics.

The police were also contacted and notified that a HAZMAT team was assembled and was being sent to the stadium for decontamination. The HAZMAT team arrived to the stadium at 12:12pm on October 12th and decontamination procedures were initiated. The clean-up of the stadium and the surrounding area took approximately 10 hours, and some residents surrounding the stadium were evacuated during the decontamination process to protect them from possible exposure. The Arizona Cardinals stadium is a dome, but has an open roof, so it was not initially clear if the aerosolized spores of anthrax were contained within the stadium or had traveled to the surrounding areas outside of the stadium.

The HAZMAT team worked in cooperation with the local police department, fire department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had also been called-in due to the terrorist nature of this event.

Residents were allowed to return to their homes after the HAZMAT team determined that there were no exposure risks outside of the stadium. However, the stadium remained closed for a week to ensure that all areas of the very large stadium had been thoroughly decontaminated and to allow the local police department and the FBI to conduct investigations.

At 12:30pm on October 12th the county health department received a call from Dr. Marquez at Phoenix Baptist Hospital indicating that a patient had reported to their ER room with symptoms that are suspicious for inhalation anthrax and the patient notified hospital staff that he had been at the game on the 11th. Dr. Marquez ordered a blood test and confirmation was confirmed on October 14th at the state lab. This patient was the first index case.

Shortly thereafter, at 12:44pm on October 12th, the county health department received another call, this time from Dr. Wongduan at St. Joseph’s Medical Center indicating that he had heard about the news report regarding the possible bioterrorist attack yesterday at the Cardinals game, and he had a patient that has symptoms that are concerning for inhalation anthrax. He wanted to report the case to the health department before lab confirmation. This case was also lab confirmed via a blood culture on October 14th.

The health departments received a total of 8 calls on October 12th from hospitals and dozens of calls from concerned citizens that had attended the game. The public health officials told those concerned citizens to report to an ER room at a local hospital and await instructions from hospital staff. The hospitals were instructed to begin administering antibiotics for any patients that presented with symptoms concerning for inhalation anthrax. A total of 10 patients that presented with symptoms on October 12th were confirmed via blood test on October 14th.

After learning of the advisement from the public health officials, some hospitals recalled patients that were initially diagnosed on the evening of the 11th and early morning on the 12th that presented to the hospital with flu-like symptoms. It is felt that these patients may have been misdiagnosed and were possibly exposed to the inhalation anthrax. However, none of these patients were confirmed as having anthrax.

Since inhalation anthrax is a fast-developing disease, it was necessary to start confirmed cases of inhalation anthrax on ciprofloxacin, along with another antibiotic such as penicillin or doxycycline given intravenously. Public health officials decided to recommend to doctors not to use the Biothrax vaccine, due to its controversial nature, unless they felt it necessary in a particular case and then the physician should discuss the possible side-effects with the patient before administering it. Exposed individuals also underwent decontamination procedures at hospitals to include removing any contaminated clothing from the patient and to have the patient shower with soap and water for about 20 minutes. Bleach solution was not recommended unless the exposed individual could not be decontaminated with soap and water for some reason, and then if necessary, the diluted bleach solution to be used after the soap and water shower, and then rinsed off after a 10 to 15-minute period. Isolation or quarantine was deemed unnecessary since anthrax is non-communicable, so only standard precautions applied.

Over the course of one week, from the exposure date of October 11th, a total of 112 people were confirmed via blood culture as having inhalation anthrax. Public health authorities had feared that there might be considerably higher numbers given the aerosolized manner of the substance. It is unclear as to why more people were not infected, perhaps when the police investigation is concluded more will be understood about how the terrorists released the substance. However, police and FBI investigations revealed that all of the infected individuals were seated in one section of the stadium, so other areas of the stadium were apparently not affected. It is unclear at this time if this was intentional by the terrorists or if the aerosolized spores somehow deviated from the planned attack area.

Of the 112 laboratory confirmed cases, 10 of them reached second stage development of inhalation anthrax, which was confirmed by a chest x-ray, presumably because these individuals did not report to a hospital ER room in a timely manner. Of these 10 individuals, 9 died of inhalation anthrax. This resulted in a total mortality rate of 8%, however, of the victims that reached the second stage of symptoms for inhalation anthrax there was a 90% mortality rate. All exposed patients are currently receiving treatment and will continue to receive treatment for up to 60 days. Currently all other patients are responding well to the treatment.

Conclusion

On October 12th, 2009 a terrorist group calling themselves “The Movement” contacted local media in Phoenix, Arizona to notify them that aerosolized anthrax had been released at the Arizona Cardinals football stadium in Glendale on October 11th. The media immediately contacted public health officials and the Phoenix Police Department. Public health officials then contacted local hospitals to notify them to be on the look-out for suspected cases of inhalation anthrax and to test all suspicious patients with a blood test. Infected patients were decontaminated and started on antibiotics which included a combination of ciprofloxacin and either penicillin or doxycycline. A HAZMAT team was also sent to the Arizona Cardinals stadium to close down and decontaminate the entire area. The decontamination of the surrounding neighborhoods was completed within 10 hours and residents were allowed to return to their homes. The stadium and adjacent facilities were closed for one week to ensure a thorough decontamination of the area.

Laboratory confirmed cases of inhalation anthrax were totaled at 112. Public health officials expected this number to be much higher, but it was determined by the Phoenix Police Department along with the FBI that only one section of the stadium was exposed to the aerosolized anthrax. Of the 112 confirmed laboratory cases of inhalation anthrax, 10 of them reached “second stage” symptoms, which resulted in a total of 9 deaths from this terrorist action. There have been no further cases identified since October 18th, 7 days after the exposure date. However, public health officials will continue to provide surveillance for up to 60 days. The Phoenix Police Department’s investigation into the terrorist actions is ongoing as is that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Background

Anthrax is a naturally-occurring bacterium which lives in soil and can remain alive for years as a spore, which can then be passed to humans that handle infected livestock or eat contaminated, undercooked meat (Null, 2003). Anthrax occurs in three forms: pulmonary, cutaneous, and gastrointestinal (Heymann, 2008). Cutaneous anthrax is the most common, accounting for greater than 95% of cases affecting humans (Heymann, 2008).

Symptoms of cutaneous anthrax typically begin with itching of the affected site, followed by a lesion developing into a depressed black eschar, this last phase taking approximately 2 to 6 days (Heymann, 2008). The eschar is then surrounded by moderate to severe edema, which is quite extensive; there is usually little to no pain (Heymann, 2008). However, there is often considerable swelling around the site of the sore and bouts of shivering and chills in the affected individual are common (Null, 2003).

Common sites of infection include the hands, forearms, head and neck; this is because these are exposed parts of the body and cutaneous anthrax requires a pre-existing cut or break in the skin for it to enter into the body (Heymann, 2008). If left untreated, the disease may spread to the lymph nodes and into the bloodstream, though this is fairly rare (Heymann, 2008; Null, 2003). The fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax is between 5 to 20% if untreated, however, with treatment fatality is rare (Heymann, 2008).

If anthrax were to be used as a bioweapon, it would most likely be aerosolized which would result in inhalation anthrax (Null, 2003).  Early symptoms of inhalation (also known as pulmonary anthrax) are a mild cough, headache, fever, and general malaise, which makes them virtually indistinguishable from symptoms of influenza, unless a blood test is done (Null, 2003). However, within 3 to 4 days, symptoms progress to respiratory distress, enlargement of the mediastinum, immune system failure, shock, and death within 48 hours after the release of the toxin (Heymann, 2008; Moore, 2001). For untreated cases, fatality is 100% and may occur in as many as 95% of treated cases if therapy is begun more than 48 hours after the onset of symptoms (Cieslak et al., 1999).

Gastrointestinal anthrax is not common in developed countries, but is seen in poor or developing countries, usually by way of eating contaminated meat (Heymann, 2008). The consumption of tainted meat usually takes the form of gastrointestinal anthrax, though oropharyngeal may also develop (Heymann, 2008). With oropharyngeal anthrax the lesion is in the mouth cavity, on the tongue, mucosa, tonsils, or pharynx wall (Heymann, 2008). Early symptoms of oropharyngeal anthrax include sore throat and extensive edema in the throat that may lead to blockage of the trachea (Heymann, 2008). The lesion of gastrointestinal anthrax is typically found in the intestinal tract and is ulcerative and massively edematous, which leads to hemorrhaging and obstruction of the gastrointestinal tract (Heymann, 2008). The incubation period for both gastrointestinal and oropharyngeal anthrax is approximately 3 to 7 days (Heymann, 2008). It is not always fatal, but even with treatment, this form of anthrax has a high fatality rate (Heymann, 2008).

Naturally occurring cases of anthrax may come about from environmental disasters, like tsunamis or floods which can cause erosion of burial sites of infected animals, which in turn can lead to contact of the disease by humans (Null, 2003). Any contact with an infected animal, including touching the hair or skin of the animal as well as handling bones of a deceased animal that was infected can result in a human becoming infected with anthrax (Cieslak et al., 1999). Biting flies that have bitten a diseased animal and then bite a human can also infect the human, as well as touching contaminated soil (Heymann, 2008). Inhalation anthrax occurs primarily in industrial or factory settings where animal hides are processed and there is poor ventilation, which results in ingestion of the anthrax spores (Heymann, 2008).

The incubation period for anthrax is generally 1 to 7 days, though incubation periods of up to 60 days is possible (Heymann, 2008). Person to person transmission is exceptionally rare and has only been documented with cutaneous anthrax (Heymann, 2008).

Anthrax has also been both used and studied as part of some countries bioweapons programs, perhaps most notoriously by the Japanese Imperial Army during the 1930’s and 1940’s, through the infamous Unit 731; and by the Soviets during the cold war era (Miller et al., 2001).  Anthrax has also been used as a bioweapon by domestic terrorists, most recently and perhaps most notably in October of 2001, which infected and killed a number of Americans (Null, 2003). According to military and counterterrorism experts anthrax is near or at the top of any list of most likely bioweapon (Cieslak et al., 1999; Moore, 2001). Given the relatively short incubation period, and rapid progression of disease, identification of the exposed population within 24 to 48 hours and employment of therapeutic and prophylactic strategies are likely to present a challenge (Cieslak et al., 1999).

There is a vaccine for anthrax, Biothrax (also known as AVA, which stands for Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed), though it is not made available to the general public, it is recommended for lab workers and workers that handle potentially contaminated raw materials who may come into contact with anthrax through their job duties (Heymann, 2008). The vaccine was also administered to American military troops prior to their campaign in Iraq, as a precautionary measure against Saddam Hussein’s army which it was feared might use anthrax as a bioweapon against American soldiers (Null, 2003).

The vaccine is effective in preventing cutaneous and inhalation anthrax and is designed for preventing exposure to anthrax, though it can be administered as an “after-the-event” treatment in the case of a biological weapons attack, for example, and would be combined with antibiotic therapy, of which ciprofloxacin is considered the first line treatment though doxycycline or amoxicillin maybe used in some cases (Heymann, 2008). However, ciprofloxacin and doxycycline have side effects which may be more severe than other antibiotics which also may work against anthrax, like penicillin (Null, 2003).

Prevention control for naturally acquired anthrax includes vaccinating livestock, properly disposing of dead livestock by burning them, ensuring proper ventilation systems in factories and labs, and educating employees that might come into contact with anthrax about safe practices such as wearing protective masks and clothing (Heymann, 2008).
Anthrax is essentially non-contagious, so quarantine of humans is unnecessary and standard preventive measures when handling the patient such as wearing disposable gloves, changing bedding soiled with lesion fluid, disinfecting clothing, and washing hands regularly would be applicable (Heymann, 2008).

Assumptions

On October 12th, 2009 a group calling themselves “The Movement” contacted members of the local media in Phoenix to tell them that a bioterrorism “bomb” had been released at the Arizona Cardinals stadium in Glendale during a football game on October 11th, which had several thousand fans in attendance. The group claimed that it had released  anthrax (a category A agent) in an aerosolized manner, though this has yet to be confirmed.

Of great concern to the county and state health departments is the high number of citizens in Phoenix that might be affected due to the amount of residents potentially exposed at the football game. Shortly after receiving the call from The Movement, physicians at hospitals in Phoenix began reporting patients that were beginning to show early symptoms of what might be inhalation anthrax. The disease progression is expected to have a normalized progression and those patients reporting to local hospitals are being tested for inhalation anthrax and will receive “after-the-event” vaccinations and antibiotic therapy as well as decontamination if the tests are positive. The local and state health departments are currently working with the media to release a message to those in attendance at the game to report immediately to an ER room at a hospital to get tested for possible inhalation anthrax exposure.

References:

Cieslak et al., T.J. & Eitzen, E.M. (1999). Clinical and Epidemiologic Principles of Anthrax.  Emerging Infectious Diseases, 5(4), 552-555.

Heymann, D.L. (2008). Control of Communicable Diseases Manual (19th ed.). Baltimore: United Book Press.

Miller et al., J., Engelberg, S., and Broad, W. (2001). Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Moore, P. (2001). Killer Germs: Rogue Diseases of the Twenty-First Century. London: Carlton Books.

Null, G. (2003). Germs, Biological Warfare, Vaccinations: What You Need to Know. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Generational differences in the workplace

November 18th, 2009

the-generational-divide

I first heard about the concept of generational differences in the workplace about 2 years ago while I was studying for my first Master’s degree with Roosevelt University. I suppose I already knew about generational differences, but I had never really observed them in my own life until I started working in my current Government job in public health.

It seems the topic is getting a lot of discussion, at least online, because there are 4 different generations in the workplace now for I guess the first time in history. Though the numbers of “Eisenhower’s” are dwindling as they are at or past the traditional retirement age, and now the older end of the Baby Boomers are retiring and Generation X, my generation, is starting to take on more leadership roles in the workplace as we now move into midlife. Generation Y is of course coming up behind us. For myself, I think I’m a pretty prototypical Gen X. I was born in 1969, so it puts me at the slightly older end of the range, but I was in high school during the 80′s and I  grew-up in the 80′s which is what I think really makes someone “Gen X.”

However, I don’t notice myself having too many conflicts with Gen Y. I seem to fit in with them very easily. But I like the techno gadgets and social networking sites and texting and writing blogs (obviously) and twittering too! So maybe I’m more of a young Gen X at heart.

Anyway, I have noticed a real difference, a “generational gap” if you will, to use an overused term one more time, amongst Gen X and Boomers and Eisenhower’s. There aren’t many Eisenhower’s generation left in the workplace now since they are basically at or past retirement age. But the Boomers and the Eisenhower’s have a lot of the same ideologies and work habits I think.

The following is a collection of observations I’ve made, along with some things that I’ve read through various sources.

Let’s start with an example:

I have a coworker, who is a young Baby Boomer, he is actually only about 7 years older than me. But you would think we were 20 years apart. He is very conservative and believes that what you do at your job doesn’t really matter. What is more important is to be seen working late, even if you aren’t really working. He likes to call it “face time.” So he will stay around the office later than most, but his work quality is horrible, he makes a lot of mistakes. But in his way of thinking, and I think a lot of Boomers think this way, getting the job done or done right matters less than having people think you are working hard and giving more of yourself.

For me, and I think this is pretty typical of Gen X, I’m not so concerned about people thinking of me as someone who is always willing to working overtime. But I like to be known as someone that when he is at the office does a good job. I get the job done, and my work that I put in is quality work. However, when the 8 hours is up, now it’s my time and I’m off to pursue other personal interests. WE call that “work/life balance.” Our total weekly working hours is probably less, but the quality of both our work and our personal life is probably more.

Another big difference that I’ve noticed is communication style. Boomers almost without exception prefer face-to-face contact or using the telephone. With Gen X, it is variable, but many Gen X like to use email for communication. WE find it more efficient and I think we like having the written documentation.

Many of the Boomers at the office prefer the phone over email to the point that some of them won’t even use email to communicate. We have one coworker who brags that he never even reads his emails. I think he thinks he is “cool in an old-school” kind of way, but most of us just think of him as unprofessional.

The advantage of email I think is that it is less intrusive. If I call you on the telephone, maybe I’m interrupting you. But if I email you, you can read it at your leisure and get back to me. Hopefully!


Another difference I’ve noticed is in terms of education. I think Boomers view education as a means to an end. In other words, you get the degree to get a job. If the degree doesn’t make you any money, then it is worthless. Whereas I feel that the education itself is its own reward. Yes, I would like to make more money with the degree, but if I don’t, that’s okay too. Education for its own sake and lifelong learning are cornerstones of Gen X beliefs.

And Boomers like their predecessors, the Eisenhower’s, prefer a rigid top-down approach to management. Boomers grew up in an era where they embraced ideas about equality, especially in the workplace, but when they hit midlife they sold out on those beliefs and cashed in on BMWs and stock portfolios. For Gen X, I think we prefer a more collegial atmosphere, realizing that responsible people can “self-manage.” Boomers on the other hand seem to like to lead or be led.

Of course there are always exceptions and individual personalities sometimes “win-out” over generational tendencies, but these have been my observations.


Cheap flights from LAX to Thailand

October 20th, 2009

The title of this blog entry is a bit misleading, because I’m not really going to necessarily tell you how to get the cheapest flight, but rather the best flight for your money to Thailand.

From LAX (Los Angeles) to BKK (Bangkok), you have several options. On my first trip I flew Cathay Pacific, which is a Hong Kong based airlines. The service was good, food was excellent for airline food, and the plane was new with above average leg room in the economy section. However, I wouldn’t necessarily recommend them if you are travelling on a budget as they are usually quite pricey. Sometimes their tickets are $2 to $3 thousand dollars – more than triple the price of other carriers. But they do have specials sometimes and you can find tickets to BKK in the $1,000 – $1,500 range. On the downside, Cathay Pacific does not at this time offer a direct flight to BKK, so you have to change planes in Hong Kong.

EVA Airways is based out of Taiwan, and is more of a long-distance budget carrier. The planes are so-so, the airline food is so-so to pretty good, and the in-flight service is very good. They also have individual monitors and on-demand movies for every seat in the economy section. And a decent selection of movies, usually 4 or 5 new release titles. My ticket price range with them has been about $750 – $900. If you are looking to save some money, EVA is a nice choice and much better than any American based airline.

EVA used to have a good frequent flier program a few years back, but with recent budget cuts in the industry in an effort to make more money they have discontinued use of the LAX  VIP lounge for Silver card carriers. EVA also does not offer a direct flight to BKK, so you will need to change planes in Tai Pei, Taiwan – but this is probably the most efficient airport I’ve ever been to for connecting flights. It’s about a 3-hour flight from Tai Pei onto BKK.

The last time I flew EVA was about 2 years ago – I had a bad customer service experience with them in the VIP lounge at the Tai Pei Airport, and have not flown them since. But overall, I would still recommend them as a nice choice if you are on a budget.

I think your best flight option to BKK is Thai Airways. They DO offer a direct flight from LAX to BKK, and if you book far enough in advance and aren’t travelling at a holiday time, you can usually get the ticket for $1,300 – $1,500. Thai Airways is a nice airline, but the service, food, and seating is all average in my opinion – nothing really special and above EVA other than the option of the direct flight from LAX. So you may prefer to save the extra $500 and go with EVA Airways. However, you should always do a price comparison and see what you can find. If I could get the Thai Airways flight for only a couple of hundred above the EVA price, I’d jump on it! Also Thai Airways offers some pretty good hotel voucher deals for stays in top hotels throughout Thailand. So after only one trip internationally you are likely to accrue enough airline miles to quality for a hotel voucher worth about $100 for your next trip. So keep that in mind too when price comparison shopping.

A lot of people like to use those cheap ticket sites, but sometimes you can find even better deals directly on the airline’s website. Plus, I like to accrue the airline mileage  and if you fly the same airlines you can move up in their frequent flier program and get to use the VIP lounge.

*last updated July, 2010

Thesis: Using Gardner and Gagné to Effectively Design Individualized Instruction

October 18th, 2009

NOTE: this is a modified edition of my original thesis; it has also been formatted to fit in this blog.

NOTE: If you plan to use my thesis in your own paper, research, or thesis or dissertation, please be sure to properly cite my work. Thanks!

Using Gardner and Gagné to Effectively Design Individualized Instruction

A Master’s Project submitted to: The faculty of Evelyn T. Stone College of Professional Studies

In candidacy for the degree of Master of Arts, Training and Development

By Daniel A. Garcia

Roosevelt University
Chicago, IL

May 15, 2009

Abstract

In 1983 Howard Gardner proposed a theory of multiple intelligences that challenged the established notion of a general intelligence. This general intelligence argued Gardner was measuring logical-mathematical and linguistic types of intelligences, which were intelligences prized in the western secular world, but not accounting for other types of intelligences like musical, kinesthetic, spatial and personal intelligences. The important aspect for instructional design is that an instructional designer must take into account these different types of multiple intelligences and their derived preferred learning styles when designing instruction. Blending Gardner’s multiple intelligences theory with Gagné’s solid foundation of instructional design let’s us tailor instruction to each individual, thereby making the designed instruction optimal for learning.


Using Gardner and Gagné to Effectively Design Individualized Instruction

The theory that I’ve been most influenced by in my studies of training and development and adult learning in particular with respect to instructional design has been Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences. Multiple Intelligences (MI) theory “rejects the unitary concept of intelligence and proposes that intelligence is not limited to the capacity for rapid, logical problem-solving and convergent thinking but also includes the abilities to create products and to provide valuable services” (Shearer, 2004, p. 3).  I believe that for instructional design to be optimally effective, instruction must be designed with individual learning style preference (and multiple intelligences) taken into account.

I believe that designed instruction can be optimally effective in this way by blending Gardner’s MI theory with Gagné’s nine instructional events.  Before attempting to describe the application of both Gardner’s MI theory and Gagné’s nine instructional events to the design of instruction, it will be necessary to discuss each in some length.

Gardner v. Traditional Intelligence Theory

Gardner’s theory is quite a radical break from what has often been thought of as “traditional intelligence.” At the beginning of the 20th century it was Alfred Binet and his colleague Theodore Simon that devised the first set of intelligence tests “in order to sift out retarded children and to place other children at their appropriate grade level” (Gardner, 1983, p. 15). The tests were soon available for widespread use and the mania for evaluating people for specific purposes began. Schools, the military and industrial organizations all made use of the newly devised tests (Gardner, 1983).  Gardner theorizes that the IQ test caught on so well because they were easy to administer, easy to score, and there is a numerical end result, which reinforces a logical-mathematical bias (Gardner & Moran, 2006).

In light of discussions of multiple intelligences largely reawakened by Gardner in recent decades, most scholars within psychology and nearly all scholars outside the field, are now convinced that “enthusiasm over intelligence tests has been excessive, and that there are numerous limitations in the instruments themselves and in the uses to which they can and they should be put” (Gardner, 1983, p. 16). Generally speaking, the tasks are definitely skewed in favor of individuals in societies with schooling and particularly in favor of individuals who are accustomed to taking paper-and-pencil tests or computer-based, featuring clearly delineated answers (Gardner, 1983). Gardner (1983) notes that the tests do have predictive power for success in schooling, but relatively little predictive power outside the school context, especially when more potent factors like social and economic background have been taken into account. Gardner (1999) suggests that the traditional IQ  test having predictive powers in school is because most curriculum is designed with a logical-mathematical and linguistic bent to it, which are the areas of intelligence that general IQ (also known as “g”) measure. It stands to reason that if one has invented a concept such as “g” and then has created curriculum to support this notion of “g” that studies would then find one correlates with one another (Gardner, 1999).

Gardner (1993, xxiv) writes:

“In my view, if we are to encompass adequately the realm of human cognition, it is necessary to include a far wider and more universal set of competences than we have originally considered. And it is necessary to remain open to the possibility that many – if not most – of these competences do not lend themselves to measurement by standard verbal methods, which rely heavily on a blend of logical and linguistic abilities.”

Gardner (1983) feels that a prerequisite for a theory of multiple intelligences is that it captures a reasonable gamut of the kinds of abilities valued by human cultures.

About his theory of multiple intelligences Gardner (1983, p. 284) writes:

“And what of my use of the loaded term of intelligence? …part of the motivation for using this term is my desire to put forth a more viable model of intelligence: I seek to replace the current, largely discredited notion of intelligence as a single inherited trait (or set of traits) which can be reliably assessed through an hour-long interview or paper and pencil test.”

Gardner’s view of intelligence differs in another key way from that of the traditional notion of IQ. Gardner (1983, p. 316) writes “what recent research has shown, virtually incontrovertibly, is that whatever differences may initially appear, early intervention and consistent training can play a decisive role in determining the individual’s ultimate level of performance.” This is a key difference between traditional views of IQ and Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences, for traditional IQ has generally been thought of as almost exclusively inherited whereas Gardner places a much stronger emphasis on environment.

It is safe to conclude that in Gardner’s view, western society has embraced logical-mathematical and to a lesser degree, linguistic types of intelligence as being desirable. Where did this Western view of logical-mathematical intelligence being the supreme and most desirable intelligence come from? Gardner (1983, p. 160) states “since mathematics and science are among the proudest achievements of Western society, it is not surprising that the initial claims for “superiority” came in these areas.” Gardner (1983) reasoned that this was due to Western social scientists and perhaps particularly psychologists importing their methods of testing to foreign lands and cultures for modes of thinking similar to the Western view, and they found little evidence for them. This begat a sort of “we” are smarter than “them” view based on perceived superiority of the Western view of intelligence, which had been narrowly defined as primarily logical-mathematical.

Gardner (1983) also wrote that when these social scientists accrued evidence about thinking within the foreign culture itself, particularly those tasks that were of value to the people of that culture, that the alleged differences between “primitive” and “domesticated” minds were lessened and the “primitives” came off as superior to the investigators sometimes.

Gardner (1983, p. 160):

“When one searches in other traditional cultures for explicit evidence of the mathematician or the scientist, as we know him, there emerges little evidence that such concerns matter. A desire to build up an elaborate abstract system of mathematical relations for its own sake, or to come up with experiments to test a set of propositions about how the world works, does seem to be a concern of the Western world…”

This traditional notion of IQ has been termed by those scientists as “g” – standing for “general intelligence.” Gardner (1983) believes that apparent support for “g” comes chiefly from the fact that most tests of intelligence are paper and pencil exercises which rely heavily on linguistic and logical-mathematical abilities. Therefore, individuals strong in these two areas will perform well on tests of general intelligence, in contrast to individuals whose strengths lie elsewhere, for example, in kinesthetic or musical types of intelligences.

Proponents of “g” argue against Gardner’s claims of multiple intelligences by stating that there is no empirical support and therefore no validity for his theory (Waterhouse, 2006). However, Waterhouse (2006) also concedes that the empirical evidence for general intelligence does not exclude the possibility of MI. Furthermore, Gardner has never claimed that MI theory represents “the” definitive description of human cognitive capacities (Gardner & Moran, 2006). Instead, Gardner believes that “relatively independent yet interacting intelligences provide a better understanding of the variety and scope of human cognitive feats than do competing accounts” (Gardner & Moran, 2006, p. 227).

“It has taken a century and many millions of dollars to bring IQ testing to its current, not especially impressive (although highly reliable!) status” (Gardner & Moran, 2006, p. 229).

Gardner’s Eight Intelligences

Gardner (1983) proposed that there are actually seven distinct intelligences: linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences (this is what we have traditionally thought of as “intelligence” in the Western world for more than 100 years), musical intelligence, kinesthetic intelligence, spatial intelligence, and interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences (sometimes also referred to as the personal intelligences). Gardner (1999) later added an eighth intelligence: naturalistic intelligence.

Gardner (1983) believes that on comparative basis intelligences like musical, kinesthetic, spatial and the personal intelligences are less highly valued in our society compared to logical-mathematical forms of intelligence.

In the American view and perhaps in the Western view at large, musical ability is thought of as just that, ability, not a “true” intelligence. Gardner (1983) however believes that musical thinking involves its own rules and constraints and cannot simply be assimilated to linguistic or logical-mathematical thinking; thereby qualifying it as a separate intelligence, not capable of being assessed by current intelligence tests.

A similar fate has befallen spatial intelligence. One of the individuals who argued strongly for the existence and independence of spatial ability was L.L. Thurstone, the 20th century  psychometrician that is perhaps most noted for his contributions to the idea of standard deviations of IQ scores (Shearer, 2004) . Thurstone saw spatial intelligence as one of the seven primary factors of intellect. Most students of intelligence testing since Thurstone have reinforced his conclusion that there is something special about spatial ability (Shearer, 2004). Yet in our American view of intelligence, spatial intelligence is nowhere to be found. This can have profound impacts on both education and instructional design for if one is designing instruction for an individual or even group of learners that have a high intelligence in spatial ability, designing instruction in a traditional logical-mathematical or linguistic style may not be optimal.

In Gardner’s view spatial intelligence is an invaluable asset in our society especially for those pursuits such as an artist, sculptor or mathematical topologist (Gardner, 1983). Another endeavor, chess, Gardner (1983, p. 192) states “if one had to choose a single area to illustrate the centrality of the spatial intelligence, chess would suggest itself as a strong candidate. The ability to anticipate moves and their consequences seems closely tied to strong imagery.” Certainly many of us would deem chess to be an intellectual’s game. So why isn’t spatial intelligence considered more prominently in our views of general intelligence?

Other cultures have of course embraced other types of intelligences. For example, Gardner (1983, p. 207) writes “in speaking of masterful use of the body, it is natural to think of the Greeks.”  According to Gardner (1983), “the Greeks revered the beauty of the human form and through their artistic and athletic endeavors sought to find a harmony between mind and body, with the mind trained to use the body properly, and the body trained to respond to the expressive powers of the mind”(p. 207).  Gardner terms this type of intelligence bodily-kinesthetic intelligence (sometimes also just referred to as kinesthetic intelligence). Again in our modern American society and indeed throughout much of Western society, we value our athletes (who Gardner would argue are high in bodily-kinesthetic intelligence) but yet we don’t value it on the same intelligence level as we do logical-mathematical types of intelligences. Clearly, the ancient Greeks would disagree.

Gardner (1983, p. 208) points to another example of traditional IQ bias when he states “a notion that what we do with our bodies is somehow less privileged , less special, than those problem-solving routines carried out chiefly through the use of language, logic, or some other relatively abstract symbolic system.” Gardner (1983) points to the dancer, the actor and the athlete as roles in our society that highlight kinesthetic intelligence. Another profession that is often a manifestation of kinesthetic intelligence is that of the engineer (Gardner, 1983).

Of personal intelligences (intrapersonal and interpersonal) Gardner (1983) believes that Freud emphasized that a person’s interest in other individuals was justified chiefly as a better means of gaining further understanding of one’s own problems, wishes, anxieties, and of achieving one’s goals. In contrast, Gardner (1983) found the American psychologist, William James, to have a different definition, one that dealt much more with the individual’s relationship to the community. However, despite this different orientation, both psychologists embraced a sense of self and of relating to others. These are things that Gardner would deem to be personal intelligences. According to Gardner (1983) Freud emphasized a more intrapersonal view whereas James emphasized a more interpersonal view.

At its most advanced level intrapersonal knowledge allows one to “detect and to symbolize complex and highly differentiated sets of feelings, whereas interpersonal intelligence is turned outwards to other individuals” (Gardner, 1983, p. 239). The individual high in interpersonal intelligence may also be described as a “people person” – she likes to be around others, and they like to be around her. “The core capacity here is the ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals and in particular among their moods, temperaments, motivations and intentions” (Gardner, 1983, p. 239). In an advanced form, interpersonal knowledge “permits a skilled adult to read the intentions and desires – even when these have been hidden – of many other individuals and to potentially act upon this knowledge” (Gardner, 1983, p. 239). An emerging sense of self proves to be a key element in the realm of personal intelligences. “A developed sense of self often appears as the highest achievement of human beings, a crowning capacity which supersedes and presides over other more mundane and partial forms of intelligence (Gardner, 1983, p. 242).

A note here seems in order; while some cultures value personal forms of intelligence others may feel it necessary to embrace the larger community at the hest of the development of the “self.” And rather than to seek therapy for the enlightenment or the betterment of the “self” some cultures may instead pursue acts of selflessness (Gardner, 1983). The Western notion of the solitary “hero” struggling against the hostile environment like Tom Hanks in Cast Away symbolizes our juxtaposition to many Eastern cultures that value more interpersonal forms of intelligence – like working effectively with others in a group. However, despite variations Gardner believes that every society “offers at a minimum a tacit sense of self rooted in the individual’s own personal knowledge and feelings” (Gardner, 1983, p. 275).

An important consideration of Gardner’s theories of multiple intelligences is that we all possess each of these intelligences at least to some extent with some rare exceptions, but that most of us will have a dominant intelligence or perhaps two or three.

MI Theory Applied to Education & Instructional Design

MI theory was conceived and developed by Howard Gardner as an explanation of how the mind works – not as an educational policy or panacea; however, the applications of MI theory in education have been widespread, including instructional design although probably to a lesser extent (Moran, Kornhaber & Gardner, 2006).

Gardner and his educational supporters contend that the concept of traditional IQ is insufficient to evaluate, label, and plan education programs for all students (Moran, Kornhaber & Gardner, 2006). Although at first glance it may seem that this is only an issue for education in schools, instructional designers whether it is for the design of instruction in school settings or with adult learners, often take a similar approach to both educational planning and instructional design.

Gardner (1983) makes reference to social researcher Michael Cole who has conducted a number of studies on social intelligence and has found that most apparent differences in performance across cultures can be explained by the previous different experiences by the subject. And when these differences are taken into account most apparent differences vanish.

Gardner (1993) writes “the three components that usually occur together in a modern, Western secular educational institution are: attendance at a school, acquisition of various literacies, and deployment of the scientific method” (p. 333). Gardner (1993) believes that it is through an examination of these factors and their consequences that we may better understand how other cultures that do not value these same three components as highly in their educational settings may perform poorly in settings where these three components are highly valued – in a classroom or training room, or on an intelligence test.

Gardner (1993) has concluded that in traditional non-literate societies there is a high value placed on interpersonal knowledge. For societies that harbor traditional religious schools (like some Latin American countries with their Catholic schools perhaps) there is a high value on linguistic knowledge. And in our own modern secular educational settings, the value is usually placed on logical-mathematical above all else, with some value placed on linguistic and intrapersonal intelligences.

Gardner believes that the relative importance of interpersonal intelligences has diminished in modernized society. I can only imagine what he must say now in this even more modern technology era with online education on the rise!

Gardner (1983, p. 353) “It is no wonder that individuals living in societies that had only traditional schooling exhibit severe strain when they are expected to make a rapid transition to a computer-centered educational system.”

Gardner (1983) believes that the key to success in any educational program includes a balance between the abilities and desires of the target population and the particular values, opportunities, and institutions of the society at large.

“It is a principal assumption of this study that individuals are not all alike in their cognitive potentials and their intellectual styles and that education can be more properly carried out if it is tailored to the abilities and the needs of the particular individuals involved” (Gardner, 1983, p. 385).

“The cost of attempting to treat all individuals the same, or of trying to convey knowledge to individuals in ways uncongenial to their preferred modes of learning may be great: if at all possible, it is advisable to devise methods for assessing the intellectual profiles of individuals” (Gardner, 1983, p. 385).

Here we can see clearly the connection between Gardner’s theory of MI and his application to education and to instructional design, specifically calling for individualized instruction that plays on the strengths of the individual’s dominant or preferred intelligences.

Gardner (1983) believes that intelligences can function both as subject matters in themselves and as the preferred means for teaching diverse subject matter. For example, an individual with a strong musical intelligence might best be introduced to computer programming by attempting to program a single musical piece. Or an individual with strong spatial abilities might appreciate the use of a flow chart when designing instruction for them. These are examples of how we as instructional designers can design instruction utilizing Gardner’s MI theory.

In summary, I believe that Gardner’s theory of MI is a very important concept to consider when designing instruction for adult learners. We must consider our audience and their potential preferred learning styles when designing effective instruction. It’s also best to prepare an instruction that utilizes different modes of delivery such as visual, audio, and kinesthetic preferences for example in order to reach a greater audience.

Gagné and Instructional Design

The second theory that I have chosen to reflect my personal philosophy of training and development is more specifically an instructional design philosophy – Gagné’s nine instructional events.

“Instructional Design (ID) is a systematic approach to designing instruction and instructional materials to achieve specified learning objectives” (Liu, 2008, p. 738). Gagné’s (1985) nine instructional events classify the types of learning outcomes. Gagné’s nine instructional events are: gaining attention, telling the learners the learning objectives, stimulating recall of prior learning, presenting the stimulus, providing learning guidance, eliciting performance, providing feedback, assessing performance, and enhancing retention (Gagné, 1985).

Gagné (1985, p. 3) defines learning as “a change in human disposition or capability, which can be retained, and which is not simply ascribable to the process of growth.” A key here in Gagné’s definition is that the change must be retained over some period of time in order to be considered “learning.” This concept known as “knowledge transfer” is often emphasized as the end goal of education (Gagné, 1985).

Gagné (1985) believes that the initial capabilities of the learner play an important part in determining the conditions required for subsequent learning. This is an important concept for instructional design because there needs to be planning in terms of the student’s capabilities both before and after any learning takes place. “The acquisition of knowledge is a process in which every new capability builds on a foundation established by previously learned capabilities” (Gagné, 1985, p. 26).

Gagné (1985) describes eight types of learning: signal learning, stimulus-response learning, chaining, verbal association, discrimination learning, concept learning, rule learning, and problem solving. Gagné (1985) theorizes that these types of learning build upon one another in a sort of hierarchy, and that for adult learners much of the learning that takes place are at the higher levels of learning, such as concept learning, rule learning and especially problem solving. But other “lower” types of learning such as signal learning and stimulus-response learning still take place, just less frequently and not typically in adult learning situations like in a classroom or a training environment (Gagné, 1985).

A potential roadblock to learning and retention of knowledge is forgetting, which Gagné believes is the result of what he terms “interference” (Gagné, 1985). Sometimes new information is learned that interferes with old information, which can result in forgetting. This is relevant to instructional design because the designer must be cognizant of how to arrange the conditions of learning in order to reduce potential interference (Gagné, 1985). According to Gagné (1985), one way to reduce the potential of interference is to make the subject matter highly distinctive.

Of concept learning, Gagné (1985) states “it is dependent upon internal neural processes or representation, which is served by language” (p. 51). This is akin to Gardner’s theorization of how language or linguistic intelligence as he refers to it is a symbolic representation that allows us to manipulate concepts and to think about them symbolically in countess ways (Gardner, 1983). This is a higher order type of learning in Gagné’s hierarchy which allows us to classify abstract properties, ideas and concepts, which is particularly relevant in adult learning (Gagné, 1985). These concepts have in some ways no meaning in their own right; they have meaning because of meaning that we assign to them with our language (Gardner, 1983). An example is the concept of “aunt.” The term “aunt” has no real meaning, until we classify it and define it as “an aunt is the sister of a parent.”

Gagné’s eighth type of learning, problem solving, is where the learner combines rules he has already learned into a great variety of novel high-order rules that can be applicable in other situations, in particular outside of the classroom or training environment (Gagné, 1985). According to Gagné, whenever a learner is encouraged to combine new ideas of any sort and to then independently arrive at a new idea from the resulting combination, he is considered to be solving a problem (Gagné, 1985).

Gagné (1985) describes four phases of learning: apprehending, acquisition, storage, and retrieval, of which the apprehending and acquisition phases are very pertinent to instructional design. This is because it is during these first two phases that it can be said “learning” is taking place (Gagné, 1985). The storage and retrieval phases are where remembering is taking place (Gagné, 1985). The apprehending phase is where the instructor or trainer must get the attention of the learner, so that he or she is open and responsive to acquire knowledge. Once the learner has apprehended to the instruction, the subject matter may be perceived and then coded for remembering (Gagné, 1985).

As previously stated, something is not considered to be “learned” unless it is remembered (Gagné, 1985). It is this long-term memory storage that is most relevant to education and training. Instruction must be designed in such a way as to lead to storage of the learned material for later recall and application (Gagné, 1985). This recall and application is what Gagné (1985) refers to as “transfer of learning” which is a key end goal for both instructional designers and trainers. After all, what good is material designed in instruction if it is either forgotten or never recalled and applied?

There are many potential barriers to remembering that must be addressed when designing instruction. Gagné (1985) lists three: the number of learning events that occur in a given time interval; the presence of distracting or interfering activities present following learning; and the passage of time before the application of the new knowledge is made. According to Gagné (1985) “intellectual skills” appear to be highly resistant to forgetting. The intellectual skills are those that use Gagné’s higher order learning types, such as classifying, rule using, and problem solving. In fact, it is a puzzling question to many instructional designers and educators as to just how much detailed information should be retained by a learner from a particular instruction (Gagné, 1985). Gagné (1985) argues that it is not necessary for the learner to remember everything from a lesson for transfer of learning to occur. If the learner applies his intellectual skills he can apply rules or problem solve in novel situations even if he has forgotten particular aspects of the lesson (Gagné, 1985). So it is particularly relevant for instructional designers to teach those higher order types of intellectual intelligences that will allow learners to apply this knowledge in later transfer of leaning opportunities. Gagné also refers to this as mediating learning. “The problem of curriculum planning, as well as lesson planning, then becomes one of identifying what intellectual skills are needed to mediate the learning…” (Gagné, 1985, p. 92).

According to Gagné (1985) a number of arrangements need to be made both before and after the specific event of instruction to ensure that learning occurs. One of these key factors is that of motivation. In this respect, Gagné holds a similar view to that of noted Behaviorist, B.F. Skinner. Skinner (1968) stated that the key element in motivation is to arrange the conditions of instruction so that they will be reinforcing. Gagné (1985) considers this to be part of the necessary development of instructional design – incorporating aspects of the design that will motivate learners to learn the knowledge or skill being taught.

Feedback is another important aspect of designing instruction according to Gagné. Gagné (1985) writes that regarding the usefulness of frequent feedback during the acquisition of rules, “the designers of instruction frequently point to the importance of confirming responses each step of the way” (p. 316).

To summarize, Gagné believes that many preparations need to be made for the act of learning to occur and together these preparations constitute what is known as instruction. These include: establishing motivation, controlling external stimulation, verbal (or written) directions, and providing feedback (Gagné, 1985).

According to Gagné (1985), it is logical to suppose that the initial step on deciding upon the conditions for learning is defining the learning objectives. Additionally, there needs to be a decision about the nature of the change in behavior that is sought when writing the learning objectives (Gagné, 1985). According to Gagné, the learning objectives should be comprised of the following four items: “a verb denoting an observable action, a description of the class of stimuli being responded to, a word or phrase denoting the object to be used by the learner, and a description of the potential correct responses” (Gagné, 1985, p. 327). The analysis of a topic begins with the statement of the terminal objective (Gagné, 1985). Gagné (1985) advises when designing instruction to work backwards, starting with the terminal objective and then determining and identifying the subordinate set of subtopics to be learned.

Gagné (1985) describes two kinds of transfer, lateral and vertical. Lateral transfer refers to a kind of generalizing over a broad range of situations that are at the approximate same level of complexity. Vertical transfer refers to the effects that learned capabilities at one level have on the learning of additional ones at higher levels. For optimal transfer, the application of the learned capability should be practiced over a variety of situations (Gagné, 1985).

Properly conducted assessments are an important source of feedback for the learner. In fact, in order for the next higher rule to be learned effectively, assessment is needed within topic and at the end of topic learning (Gagné, 1985). This helps to ensure that the learner can apply the learned knowledge in related or advanced topics.

Gagné and Gardner: Working Together

Gardner and Gagné share several common ideologies related to education and instructional design. A similar basic premise is that Gagné, like Gardner, believes that the factors that influence learning are largely environmental. This belief is a key tenet in programmed instruction for both Gagné and Gardner.

In designing instruction tailored to specific learners or target audiences, Gagné takes a position similar to that of Gardner. And it is here that we can see how the application of Gardner’s MI theory can be applied to designing instruction by use of the Gagné method.

Gagné argues that the typical classroom is not a place where designing instruction for each learner can possibly be done. However, it is perfectly possible for pre-designed instruction to take individual differences (like Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences) into account (Gagné, 1985). “The major possibilities of pre-designing instructional content to allow for individual differences have been exhibited, not in the classroom or in the textbook, but in programmed instruction” (Gagné, 1985, p. 331).

One can easily see a direct correlation here between what Gardner advocates in terms of designing instruction to multiple intelligences and preferred learning style and Gagné’s view of designing individualistic programmed instruction. According to Gagné, this is accomplished by determining the degree to which prerequisite capabilities are available and the degree to which learning guidance is needed (Gagné, 1985). Gagné expands upon this idea by listing what he feels are the positive advantages of pre-designed instruction; these include the selection of proper conditions, quality control which removes teaching variables such as teacher’s skills, pre-testing in order to determine if the correct set of learning conditions has been chosen correctly, and relieving the burden placed on the teacher so that she may focus on managing instruction, motivating, generalizing and assessing (Gagné, 1985).

Both Gagné and Gardner share similar views on the use of standardized tests. Whereas Gardner states that they are not adequately measuring the full range of intelligences of all individuals, Gagné claims that the tests are inadequate to assess individual learners (Gagné, 1985; Gardner, 1983). Gagné (1985) states that often these tests have been focused on how one learner is different from another when they should be focused on the extent to which each individual learner has met the learning objectives. This is what Gagné (1985) terms “criterion-referenced” outcomes. In this type of testing, scores are measured against an external standard (a criterion) rather than compared amongst other students.

Gagné (1985) feels that the lecture when used as a means for establishing conditions for learning leaves much to be desired. Instead Gagné advocates using a blended approach to both instruction and instructional design which may include a variety of instructional modes (Gagné, 1985). This would seem to blend ideally with Gardner’s views that instruction should be built in a way that is broad enough to serve various types of multiple intelligences or preferred learning styles (Gardner, 1983). “What is needed in each case is thoughtful design and management of the learning environment. This requires decisions that match the requirements of the conditions needed to present the proper stimulus for learning” (Gagné, 1985, p. 379). I conclude that Gardner would whole-heartedly agree.

References:

Gagné, R. M. (1985). The conditions of learning and theory of instruction (4th ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (1993). Multiple intelligences: The theory in practice. New York: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence reframed. New York: Basic Books

Gardner, H. & Moran, S. (2006). The science of multiple intelligences theory: A response to Lynn Waterhouse. Educational Psychologist, 41(4), 227-232.

Liu, G. (2008). Innovating research topics in learning technology: Where are the new blue oceans? British Journal of Educational Technology, 39(4), 738-747.

Moran, S., Kornhaber, M., & Gardner, H. (2006). Orchestrating multiple intelligences. Educational Leadership, 64(1), 22-27.

Shearer, B. (2004). Multiple intelligences theory after 20 years. Teachers College Record,106(1), 2-16.

Skinner, B. F. (1968). The technology of teaching. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Waterhouse, L. (2006). Multiple intelligences, the Mozart effect, and emotional intelligence: A critical review. Educational Psychologist, 41(4), 207-225.