Abstract
In August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast killing nearly 2,000 people and causing approximately 100 billion dollars in damage. The disaster was ranked as one of the deadliest in United States history, with New Orleans suffering a great bulk of the damage. Eventually about 80% of the city became flooded which caused a series of public health issues. The damage of this natural disaster was shocking but even more shocking was how the response from local, state and federal public health and emergency response agencies was mishandled. Not only was the public health response criticized but it seems that New Orleans was not adequately prepared to handle such an event. Three areas will be discussed in this paper: the roles and responsibilities of the local, state and federal public health authorities and how these roles were unmet; how these agencies should have worked together before and after the disaster; and how these agencies could have better handled the problems that arose during and after the event. This paper will target specifically how to improve leadership among public health authorities during a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, recommendations for timely decision making during such a disaster, and how to make improvements to infrastructure and preparedness before a disaster.
The mishandling of the Hurricane Katrina disaster
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August of 2005 and with it brought devastating damage to the region. The city of New Orleans was hit particularly hard and was the result of much of the monetary damage as well as human loss of life. Katrina exposed serious flaws in the United States’ disaster response capabilities (Howitt et al., 2006).
In the American disaster response schema, the initial responsibility for disaster response rests with local authorities (Howitt et al., 2006). This “bottom-up” approach makes sense in most emergencies because local governments are closer to disaster sites and therefore can provide quicker response as well as intimate knowledge of the area (Howitt et al., 2006). Aid from state or federal sources is generally provided in such instances where localized resources have been exhausted (Howitt et al., 2006). There are generally more specialized resources at the state and federal levels, but these resources are further away and their response time is longer, which is decidedly important in disaster response (Howitt et al., 2006).
Some of the other criticisms of the mishandling of Hurricane Katrina were cited as unqualified crisis managers and weak elected officials, inadequate preparedness plans, failure to make investments into infrastructure (particularly in the case of New Orleans) and poor and/or late decision making (Howitt et al., 2006).
“Crisis” emergencies like Hurricane Katrina are distinguished from routine emergencies by their novelty (Howitt et al., 2006). In other words, the “crisis” emergency presents something that the planners have not adequately planned for. According to Howitt et al., (2006), it is inevitable that at some point a community will be presented with this type of crisis disaster. These crisis disasters require different capabilities, for example: responders must identify the novel elements of the disaster. In the Hurricane Katrina disaster these novelties were: the need for assistance in the evacuation of people from their homes and from the city of New Orleans, the failing of the levees which resulted in significant flooding to the city, the unexpected use of the city’s convention center for sheltering refugees (which included providing food and law and order), and restoring water and power (Howitt et al., 2006).
Even though Hurricane Katrina was a local disaster, federal disaster relief was needed because of the magnitude of the disaster. No local municipality or state can afford to keep all the assets that are necessary in an emergency like Katrina in reserves, so turning to federal assistance was necessary (Howitt et al., 2006). As Howitt et al., (2006, p. 219) points out, the coordination of federal, state, and local agencies “demands skillful coordination of aid workers, equipment, and organizations across professions, agencies, jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public and private sectors.” No easy task. And many or most of the public health officials and organizations that were part of the post-Katrina response had little or no prior experience working together (Howitt et al., 2006).
This fact was at the center of the debacle of the post-recovery response from Hurricane Katrina; and illustrates the point quite clearly the need for such training to occur in disaster preparedness whereby individuals at the local, state, and federal levels that may be called to work together in the event of a large scale disaster need to have real-life training as such.
In fact, one could argue the point that the disaster response for Hurricane Katrina put NIMS – the National Incident Management System – that was created in 2002, to the test. Unfortunately, it was a failed effort which further points to the need for additional training on the management of this type of disaster. The purpose of NIMS, ideally, is to establish a clear division of labor and assignment of functional responsibility; and to clearly define the chain-of-command (Howitt et al., 2006). But in the disaster response post-Hurricane Katrina, the NIMS system was not effective in any of these areas. It is this writer’s opinion that the problem is one of management-style. The NIMS style opts for a “military-type” command system; even the terminology of “command system” and “chain-of-command” give the whole federal disaster response system a military feel. The military is quite capable in war-time efforts, but is not the most effective of systems in peace-keeping efforts. With NIMS on showcase in post-Katrina response we got a military-style effort; what we needed was a peace-keeping or humanitarian effort.
In the case of Katrina, there was noticeable friction between local and state officials, with the city officials and mayor on one side, and the state and governor on the other side. And both local and state officials criticized the federal response, most notably FEMA (Howitt et al., 2006).
Rosenbaum (2006, p. 437) writes: “(Katrina) exposed every public policy failure essential to community and population health. After the levees broke, we watched every single system associated with the life of a city fail: the electric grid, the water system, the sewer system, the transportation system, the telephone system, the police force, the fire department, the hospitals, even the system for disposing of corpses.” In fact, the devastation to New Orleans (and other areas) infrastructure was so great that more than one million people were homeless even as of December 2005, four months after the disaster struck (Rosenbaum, 2006).
When Hurricane Katrina struck, first responders were as unprepared for the disaster as they had been on 9/11 (Shughart, 2006). But why, and who was to blame? Why was FEMA delayed in their arrival? Why were no police or National Guard units in place to prevent looting (Shughart, 2006)? According to Shughart (2006, p. 32), “the fiasco was predictable because politicians and bureaucrats have relatively weak incentives to prepare for emergencies and to promptly mobilize the resources necessary to alleviate hardship when catastrophe strikes.”
While I agree with Shughart in that Government is certainly full of shortcomings, I’m not sure we can simply say “oh well, that’s Government for you” and forget about it. When a disaster the size of Katrina occurs and the response is as impotent as it was, I think we must address why it occurred and look for some solutions. It may not make the next big disaster go perfectly, but hopefully we can make some improvements when the inevitable occurs again.
And it isn’t as if public officials didn’t have ample warning about Katrina. On August 27, 2005 – two days before Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast – Louisiana State University’s Center for the Study of the Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes predicted that New Orleans would flood as the result of Hurricane Katrina (Shughart, 2006). With this warning in hand, city officials should have evacuated the city, but they did not. In fact, another study two years prior to Hurricane Katrina found that a category 3 hurricane, which Katrina was, would flood the city (Shughart, 2006). So there was enough evidence to suggest that city officials should have put the city on alert and began evacuation procedures, but they did not.
The Army Corps of Engineers, who were responsible for both building and monitoring the levees around New Orleans, warned state and local officials that soil erosion had caused some stretches of the flood barrier to sink as much as three feet, and these areas must be repaired (Shughart, 2006). However, the levees were not repaired. Why did city or state officials not address the levees, knowing it was simply a matter of time before a category 3 storm would hit the city? When the storm reached New Orleans, the levees failed as predicted, and about 80% of the city was under water, 20 feet deep in some places (Shughart, 2006).
The best answer for why the levees were not repaired was because citizens of New Orleans did not voice their concerns loudly enough to politicians. That is not to say that it is the residents of New Orleans fault, but rather politicians will typically only address those issues that are likely to get them reelected (Shughart, 2006). Since citizens were not talking about levee repairs for the most part, city officials and politicians ignored it, choosing to spend money in other areas (Shughart, 2006). For politicians, money spent on infrastructure and repair is wasted money, because no one really sees it, it deteriorates over time, and the public isn’t generally aware of it (Shughart, 2006). So politicians generally ignore these types of infrastructure necessities, hoping that when a problem occurs, it will “happen on someone else’s watch” (Shughart, 2006).
Another issue regarding the levees was that they were overseen by four different governing boards, made up of gubernatorial and local political appointees, each with their own autonomy to some extent (Shughart, 2006). And in the city of New Orleans, there are independent water and sewer boards that run and maintain the pumps and canals needed for draining low-lying areas (Shughart, 2006). This fragmentation clearly had foreseeable consequences, for it seems that though the Army Corps of Engineers recommended repairs to the levees, it was unclear exactly who was responsible for the repairs (Shughart, 2006). The city thought the repairs should come from the governing boards responsible for the levees, and those boards thought the cost should be footed by the city of New Orleans. And it seems that past repairs to the levee system had been done rather haphazardly – repaired well in some areas using appropriate materials, repaired poorly in other areas using cheap or ineffective materials or erecting levees that were not sufficiently high enough (Shughart, 2006).
The Orleans Levee District (one such governing board) focused more on developing its prominence in the region and acquiring more political power in order to build parks, marinas, walking paths, and a commuter airport near Lake Pontchartrain in an order to make considerable profits (Shughart, 2006). And during this development of the area, very little money was put into levee repair by this governing board, instead opting for money-making developments. Lake Pontchartrain area was one of the hardest hit by Hurricane Katrina. Most of these developments by the Orleans Levee District board were destroyed (Shughart, 2006).
To address the fragmentation of government that we saw in the Hurricane Katrina example, it is essential that in situations such as these that one governing board be over the entire flood levee system. Or at least have a governing board that has the power and authority to enforce the “local” boards with regards to repairs. And this governing board should not be compromised by having real estate development interests and money-making schemes as its first priority.
But the failures of the Katrina response were not merely inadequate preparations. Both the mayor of New Orleans and the governor of Louisiana were heavily criticized regarding their actions or rather inactions for the first few days when Hurricane Katrina hit (Shughart, 2006). Mayor Nagin chose to “wait-out” the disaster in a local high-end hotel rather than being at Louisiana’s emergency operations facility in Baton Rouge (Shughart, 2006). Shughart (2006) also criticizes Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco for allowing the mayor to determine whether or not New Orleans should be under mandatory evacuation. It would seem that perhaps Governor Blanco was not confident enough to make such a decision, perhaps fearing the move would hurt the local and/or state’s economy. But she had ample evidence that Katrina was a severe enough hurricane that significant damage was likely to be done to the area, especially in light of New Orleans’ inadequate levee protection. Though the mayor should have called for the evacuation of the city, so should have the governor stepped in and done so when the mayor failed to do so. Both are to blame for the inadequate response in my opinion.
Once Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, communications between the mayor and the governor and between the governor and other public health officials were cut-off (Shughart, 2006). The governor was able to notify the president of the need for additional assistance the day that Katrina struck the city, but did not give a detailed list of what was needed until three days later (Shughart, 2006). Apparently this was due to her lack of communications with the mayor and other public health officials in the city. And then it was several days later before President Bush actually sent any aid (Shughart, 2006). So from the time the storm hit New Orleans to the time that aid actually arrived, about 5 days had passed (Shughart, 2006).
One way that this could have been avoided was to have all of the necessary players, the mayor, the governor, and other city and state officials at the command center, rather than having them separated in different parts of the city and state. In fact, this one of the main tenets of the NIMS system: the Incident Command Post (ICD). So why the ICD was not used in this case by officials is still unclear.
President Bush was also criticized for his lackluster response (Shughart, 2006). The President kept speaking engagements and continued his vacation even after learning of what was happening in New Orleans (Shughart, 2006). Looting and rioting were problems in the flooded streets of New Orleans, particularly since a significant portion of the police force had deserted the city (Shughart, 2006). It wasn’t until several days later that President Bush suggested to the governor that she allow federal National Guard units to impose martial law on the city. However, the governor refused (Shughart, 2006). Many accused the president of racism since the majority of those left behind and homeless in New Orleans were poor and black. But Shughart (2006) contends that the lackluster response from President Bush more likely had to do with motivation. President Bush was already in his second term with no re-election to worry about, and in an area of the country that is loyal to the Republican Party (Shughart, 2006).
I agree with Shughart’s contention about President Bush to some extent. But to say that a sitting president could care less about what happens during his second term because there is no re-election value I think it a bit off. Someone doesn’t reach the level of president without being an ego-maniac to some extent, and presidents always care about their legacy. This writer’s opinion is that President Bush waited to respond because both the mayor and the governor were democrats. President Bush wanted to see them fail and struggle to some extent so he could rush in and “save the city” from the inept democratic leadership. Unfortunately for President Bush, his own response along with his FEMA appointee, Michael Brown, were equally inept.
Perhaps no one, not even the mayor or governor or president took more blame than did FEMA (Shughart, 2006). According to Shughart (2006) the cause of FEMA’s inept response to Hurricane Katrina was the result of their reorganization after 9-11 into the newly formed Department of Homeland Security, where their role in disaster preparedness was diminished and they were forced to utilize their resources to “prevent another 9-11-style attack.” This left them ill-prepared to handle a natural disaster the size of Hurricane Katrina.
But it wasn’t only that FEMA was not accustomed to the role that it was cast into during the Katrina recovery, other criticisms were leveled at the then FEMA director, Michael Brown, who by his own acknowledgement was probably not the man for the job, despite President Bush’s infamous supportive statement of “Brownie you are doing a heck of a job!” (Hsu and Glasser, 2005). President Bush’s transparent self-interest statement of Brown aside, it was quite clear that as FEMA director, Brown, a lawyer with no real background in disaster management or public health, was in over his head; some even calling him “clueless” (Hsu and Glasser, 2005 & CNN, 2006). Brown resigned his post shortly after Katrina (Hsu and Glasser, 2005).
Despite the poor leadership of FEMA, a more central issue is at hand in my opinion. We can replace all the FEMA directors we want, but the real issue is the role that FEMA has been cast into as part of the Department of Homeland Security. Acts of terrorism in this country, both foreign and domestic, have been quite rare. The amount of money that is being allocated to combat terrorism are funds that are misappropriated in my opinion. Perhaps even some republicans agreed for one of their recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security was to increase FEMA’s budget by 10% in 2007 (CNN, 2006). Additionally, an organization like FEMA must be allowed to do what it does best, disaster preparedness, not trying to thwart terror attacks – that is what the CIA and or/FBI should be doing.
What is perhaps most interesting about the ineptness of the local, state, and federal government responses was how well by comparison private companies like Wal Mart were able to offer assistance to victims of Katrina (Shughart, 2006). According to Shughart (2006, p. 42), “Wal Mart frequently beat FEMA by days in getting trucks filled with emergency supplies to relief workers and citizens.” Both Home Depot and Fed Ex also leant support in similar efficient style in the aftermath of the disaster (Shughart, 2006).
So what does this say about our Governmental preparedness to handle disasters when private companies are able to outperform them? Is it simply inevitable that the more talented of individuals will find themselves employed in the private sector because their talents are better appreciated and more rewarded there? Government would need to increase salary amounts or provide other types of incentives such as easy-qualifying home loans or student loan repayment in order to attract more talented individuals into the Government positions. Or is it less of a reflection of government personnel and more a reflection of poor infrastructure? Private sector tends to shoot for top performance due to profitability, whereas government wants standardization, control, and an acceptable level of performance.
Recommendations
In summary, there were several factors that led to the mishandling of the Katrina response, both in terms of pre-event planning and post-recovery response. First, it is conceivable that if the necessary infrastructure repairs had been put into place, most notably in the levee repairs and they had been performed to an adequate level, that the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and the havoc it brought about on New Orleans would have been much less severe. In my opinion, despite the poor leadership of the mayor, the governor, the president, and FEMA, those repairs alone may have saved countless lives and dollars. But the disaster did shed light on other issues of leadership and governmental structure that are lessons that we can learn from and hopefully use to prepare for the next inevitable disaster.
Second, fragmentation of government will always likely be an issue, but we must work to ensure that in situations such as infrastructure repair to something so important as levees, that only one governing body has the ultimate authority and responsibility for maintenance.
Third, I believe we need to restructure our disaster response into something less “military-style” as NIMS is, and opt for something that is more focused on a humanitarian effort. Perhaps lessons can be learned from how Wal Mart and other private sector businesses outperformed the military-styled NIMS system. And fourth, FEMA must be removed from the Department of Homeland Security and given back its primary role of disaster preparedness.
References:
CNN. (2006, February 14). Report: Katrina response a ‘failure of leadership.’ Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/02/13/katrina.congress/index.html
Howitt, A & Leonard, H. (2005). Katrina and the Core Challenges of Disaster Response.
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 30(1), 215-221.
Hsu, S. & Glasser, S. (2005, September 6). FEMA Director Singled Out by Response
Critics. Washington Post. Retrieved from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090501590.html
Rosenbaum, S. (2006). US Health Policy in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. American
Medical Association, 295(4), 437-440.
Shughart II, W. (2006). Katrinanomics: The politics and economics of Disaster Relief.
Public Choice, 127(1), 31-53.
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